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LESSONS FROM "SMALL CASES": REFLECTIONS ON DODSON V
ARKANSAS A CTIVITIES ASSOCIATION
Polly J Price*
Prior to a brilliant twenty-four year career on the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Richard Arnold served as a federal district judge for about
eighteen months. One of my favorite Arnold opinions dates from this time.
Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Association,' a dispute about the rules for
girls' basketball in Arkansas, is not the best known among Arnold's hun-
dreds of judicial opinions. It is perhaps not an obvious choice for this col-
lection of essays, given that assessments of Arnold's immense contributions
will no doubt center upon his work as a circuit judge. The ruling applied
only within the State of Arkansas and received little notice even there. The
defendant in the case did not appeal the decision. It seems to qualify as a
"little case"--no doubt to some, a relatively insignificant or even trivial
issue.
Yet I have two reasons for reviewing Dodson v. Arkansas Activities
Association in this tribute. First, Dodson is an early indication of Arnold's
judicial method and temperament, and in this opinion one can find harbin-
gers of the next twenty-five years of his judicial career. Judge Arnold him-
self was quick to say that there was "no such thing as a little case."2 By this
he reminded us that every case brought into a federal court is important to
the litigants. Large sums of money are not always at stake. Not all cases
involve sweeping institutional reforms or even important constitutional
questions. Nonetheless, such cases are part of the "highest calling" of the
judge:
There really isn't such a thing as a little case. A case is always a contro-
versy between two or more citizens, or non-citizens maybe, who have a
claim for justice based on the facts. The important job of the court is to
listen to the parties and decide where justice lies. It isn't the primary job
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A., M.A., E~mory University;
J.D., Harvard Law School; law clerk to the Honorable Richard S. Arnold, 1989-1991. The
author is grateful to Amy Wills, N.B.C.T., Russellville, Arkansas, for her efforts to locate
press reports about the Dodson case in Arkansas newspapers. Two attorneys representing the
parties in the Dodson case-Henry Morgan, Prosecuting Attorney for Arkansas' Ninth Judi-
cial District-East, and Ed McCorkle, of McMillan, Turner, McCorkle and Curry, Arkadel-
phia, Arkansas-provided valuable insights and were generous with their time. The author
also acknowledges with appreciation the support of Emory Law School as well as a grant
from the Emory University Research Committee for its support toward a biography of Judge
sArn.ld. This essay is part of that pro ect.
1. Dodson v. Ark. Activities Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
2. Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan and the Little Case, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
663, 669 (1999).
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of courts to seek out cosmic legal issues or to try to state new principles.
It's not the job of the lower courts at any rate. It's our job to do the ordi-
nary work of the grist of the mill day in and day out and make sure that
the individual citizen ... gets his or her due .... 3
Litigants deserve to be heard and to feel assured that they have been
heard, however trivial the issue may appear or however routine or repeti-
tious the case may seem. As Arnold noted, "An individual's lawsuit... may
be the most important thing in that person's life. ' 4 He treated Dodson v.
Arkansas Activities Association with this sort of respect, and in a manner
that revealed much about his judicial approach.
Second, although any number of Judge Arnold's opinions could be
chosen to demonstrate consistent aspects of his judicial philosophy, Dodson
is one of my favorites because of its subject. The case required Arnold to
explicate the meaning of gender equity under the United States Constitution
in the unlikely context of a dispute about the rules of high school basketball.
At the time of his decision, two other federal courts-including the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals-had already ruled the other way. Arnold's opin-
ion became the leading cited authority for the particular issue it addressed,
by those who agreed with it and those who did not. Importantly for me, the
ruling directly affected my life as a public school student in Arkansas, al-
though, as I explain below, I was not aware of Judge Arnold's role until I
came across the opinion many years later while serving as his law clerk.
The editors have encouraged personal remembrances, so along with my
discussion of Judge Arnold's role in this case, I have included some ac-
counts of conversations I later had with him about Dodson.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The litigation began well before Richard Arnold assumed his duties as
a United States District Judge in October 1978. Diana Lee Dodson,5 then a
fourteen-year-old student in the Arkadelphia public school system, filed a
lawsuit in January 1977 against the Arkansas Activities Association (AAA),
the governing body of public and private school athletic programs, asking
that girls in Arkansas be permitted to play under the same full-court basket-
ball rules as Arkansas boys played.6 Arkansas schools at that time required
that basketball for girls be played under "half-court" rules.7 The AAA,
3. Id. at 668-69.
4. Id. at 669.
5. Diana Lee Dodson was represented in the complaint by her mother, Diana R.
Dodson, then a professor at Henderson State University.
6. Dodson, 468 F. Supp. at 396.
7. Id.
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which set the rules for all member schools in the state, required that girls
compete under an archaic form of the girls' game that was not played in
college-level competition in the United States and survived in only four
states at that time.8 In this game, which had been played in Arkansas and
other states since at least the World War II era, girls' teams had six players. 9
Three players were forwards, the scorers for the team who stayed on one
end, and three others were guards, defenders who stayed at the other end. 10
No player could cross the center line of the court. Arkansas boys played the
"full-court," or "five-on-five" game, which is consistent with today's stan-
dard game of basketball."
Prior to the litigation, the member schools of the AAA were almost
evenly split on the desirability of changing the rules for the girls' game to
match those of women's college teams in the United States and other states
(except for Iowa, Oklahoma, and Tennessee). In response to requests from
some of the larger schools, the AAA had twice polled its members about
whether to change to full-court basketball for junior and senior-high girls.
12
The first poll, in August 1976, favored the change by a vote of 117 to 114.'"
A second poll, held in January 1977, reversed the rule change by a vote of
147 to 116.14 Thus, by a margin of thirty-one votes the member schools
voted to retain half-court basketball for Arkansas girls.
The federal court lawsuit was filed soon thereafter. Diana Lee Dodson,
who was then a junior high school student and a good basketball player,
claimed through her lawyer that differences in girls' and boys' junior and
senior high basketball rules mandated by the AAA deprived girls of equal
protection of laws' 5 and violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.16
The plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was tried in October
1977 in Little Rock before Judge Terry L. Shell. For many months no deci-
sion was forthcoming. The motion was still under advisement when Judge
Shell died on June 25, 1978. Judge Shell's replacement on the district court
was Richard Arnold, and Dodson was among the pending cases that Arnold
inherited when he entered duty on October 16, 1978. Judge Arnold sought
the agreement of the parties to submit the case for his decision based upon
the trial transcript and briefs. Accordingly, in November, Judge Arnold en-
8. Id. at 397.
9. Id. at 396.
10. Id.
It. Id.
12. Dodson, 468 F.Supp. at 397.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. UNITED STATES CONST. amend XIV.
16. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
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tered an order directing preparation of the hearing transcript. The transcript
was completed in February 1979. Judge Arnold issued his opinion in the
case on April 4, 1979. After the hearing transcript was prepared, a motion
for a preliminary injunction that had lingered for nearly two years came to
conclusion in a matter of weeks.
II. JUDGE ARNOLD'S DECISION
In what has been called "probably the most significant step for female
athletes in the State of Arkansas,"'17 Judge Arnold ruled in favor of Diana
Lee Dodson and declared that Arkansas's half-court rules for girls violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 Judge Arnold
determined that tradition alone, without supporting gender-related substan-
tive reasons, was not a sufficient reason to justify the fact that such rules
placed girl athletes in Arkansas at a substantial disadvantage as compared to
boy athletes.' 9 Arnold cited testimony in the record that all college women's
basketball teams played the full-court game, and recruiting for those teams
centered upon athletes who had played full-court basketball and thus were
prepared to play that game. 20 Even the University of Arkansas-today the
state's premier women's basketball program-focused its primary recruit-
ment efforts out of state. 2' Diana Lee Dodson wanted the opportunity to
compete for a basketball scholarship at the collegiate level. Arnold cited
testimony from the hearing that the disadvantage to Arkansas girls schooled
in the half-court game was "tremendous" for college scholarship competi-
22tion.
The decision was somewhat surprising because the only other courts to
address this specific claim had ruled that half-court basketball for girls did
not violate any constitutional right. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
reversing a Tennessee district court, had stated in a per curiam opinion that
distinct differences in physical characteristics and capabilities justified not
only separation of girls' and boys' sports teams by gender, but the rules for
those games as well. 23 In addition, a federal district court in Oklahoma had
dismissed a similar claim under the theory that no fundamental constitu-
17. The quotation is attributed to Alvy Early, Athletic Director, University of Arkansas-
Monticello, in Todd Traub, The Century in Arkansas Sports: 6 Girls Switch to 5-on-5, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 25, 1999, at C11.
18. Dodson, 468 F. Supp. at 396.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 397.
22. 1d.
23. Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795 (1977).
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tional rights were implicated, and even if an equal protection claim could be
stated for the case, any injury to girls was de minimis.
24
Arnold distinguished these cases politely but without apology:
This Court is aware that the two precedents most closely in point are to
the contrary. To some degree the record here appears different, because
here tradition alone is offeted to support the sex-based distinvtion. To
the extent that the reasoning of those cases is contrary to this opinion,
this Court respectfully disagrees. They are not binding authority here,
and their reasoning seems, with deference, unpersuasive.
25
Simply because the game had always been played that way in Arkansas was
not a sufficiently compelling interest to overcome the economic inequity.
As Arnold noted, girls historically had been prohibited from playing the
more rigorous full-court game of basketball because with their "bustles,
long trains, and high starched collars," they could not "get up and down the
court fast enough. 26
Perhaps to allay the concerns of those who might view his decision to
require that girls be allowed to play on boys' teams, Arnold also wrote:
It is proper to add a word about what this case is not about. It is not
about whether girls could or should play against boys. The question is'
whether girls are entitled to play full-court against each other. Nor is the
case concerned with discrimination between Arkansas girls and, say,
Mississippi girls. (Mississippi plays full-court.) That kind of discrimina-
tion is not cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, because it re-
sults from the action of two separate sovereigns. The point here is that
Arkansas boys are in a position to compete on an equal footing with
boys elsewhere, while Arkansas girls, merely because they are girls, are
not.
27
Judge Arnold's decision in the case was fully consistent with the pol-
icy animating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,28 but it was
not, then, a Title IX case. Although the complaint also alleged a violation of
Title IX, Arnold dismissed that claim in a footnote, stating, "There is no
evidence in this record that any 'educational program or activity' involved
,,29here received '[f]ederal financial assistance .... .. Instead, Arnold's deci-
sion turned on his analysis of the plaintiffs equal protection claim. As an
24. Jones v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150, 155-56 (W.D.
Okla. 1977).
25. Dodson, 468 F. Supp. at 398-99 (citations omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 398.
28. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2000).
29. Dodson, 468 F. Supp. at 396 n.1 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000)).
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initial matter, Arnold had no difficulty determining that the AAA's mandate
of rules for its voluntary members constituted state action: "The Associa-
tion, although not itself a governmental body, is supported in large part by
dues paid by public school districts .... The Association in effect exercises
a delegated governmental power. It is, at least for present purposes, subject
to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
30
Further, Dodson was among the earliest cases to apply the intermediate
standard of constitutional scrutiny suggested by the United States Supreme
Court in Craig v. Boren:3 1 "To withstand constitutional challenge. . . classi-
fications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 32 Because tradi-
tion alone supported Arkansas's continued requirement of half-court bas-
ketball for girls, Arnold held that this justification-because it was an out-
dated and over-broad generalization about the differences between males
and females--did not constitute an important governmental objective. Ar-
nold wrote,
Simply doing things the way they've always been done is not an "impor-
tant government objective," if indeed it is a legitimate objective at all.
Change for its own sake is no doubt to be avoided, and tradition is a
healthy thing. But tradition alone, without supporting gender-related
substantive reasons, cannot justify placing girls at a disadvantage for no
reason other than their being girls.
33
The same rationale would later be invoked by the Supreme Court in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.34 "Rational basis" review, on
the other hand, would likely sustain the challenged rules. 35 Under this stan-
dard of review, Dodson would have had to prove the complete absence of a
legitimate objective of the state.36
30. Id. at 396.
31. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
32. Id. at 197.
33. Dodson, 468 F. Supp. at 398.
34. 458 U.S. 718, 723-25 (1982) (stating that gender-based classification was insuffi-
cient if supported only by tradition).
35. This proposition is in some doubt because the district court in Cape v. Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association, 424 F. Supp. 732, 742 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd 563
F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1979), held that there was no rational relationship for the requirement of
girls' half-court basketball in Tennessee. This decision was reversed, however, by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, although it applied the heightened scrutiny, "substantial relation-
ship" test. Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass 'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795 (6th Cir. 1977).
36. The uncertainty of the standard of review for allegations of gender discrimination
during this period is exemplified, for example, in Note, The Search for a Standard of Review
in Sex Discrimination Questions, 14 Hous. L. REV. 721 (1977).
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The AAA's decision not to appeal Arnold's ruling came after polling
all of its member schools. The AAA sent letters to each of its 500 schools,
and of the 419 that responded, the great majority (303) did not want the
ruling appealed.3 7 One hundred and sixteen school districts thought that the
decision should be appealed.
The following season, all Arkansas schools complied with the ruling.
38
Full-court basketball competition for junior and senior high school girls in
Arkansas was played for the first time in the fall of 1979, leaving only two
states-Iowa and Oklahoma-still playing the half-court girls' game. Al-
though the Sixth Circuit had ruled in its favor on the issue of half-court
rules for girls, Tennessee's school activities association voted to switch to
five-on-five basketball anyway.39
Diana Lee Dodson's lawsuit was filed when she was in the ninth grade.
Judge Arnold's decision came at the conclusion of her junior year in high
school, meaning that Dodson's senior year basketball team would play un-
der full-court rules. Unfortunately, Dodson seriously injured her knee before
that year and never had the opportunity to compete for a scholarship or to
play college basketball. She attended college, but later, a tragic event
claimed her life. Diana Lee Dodson was shot and killed. 40 A roommate at
the time was later convicted of manslaughter. Some years later Judge Ar-
nold mentioned hearing about both her career-ending injury and her later
death with sadness, even though he had never met Diana Lee Dodson. His
phenomenal memory of persons was matched only by his empathy.
Ill. AN EARLY INDICATION OF RICHARD ARNOLD'S JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
The opinion in Dodson, among the first cases Arnold encountered, re-
veals several features of his approach to judicial work that would stand out
over his career. What does it tell us? Others have amply attested to his clear
and incisive writing style, and this opinion is a prime example of that. Ar-
nold also treated individuals' claims of constitutional violations with great
sensitivity. But in addition, this opinion provides an example of at least
three other characteristics that Arnold himself would later suggest to be
essential for continued public acceptance of the justice system. In the day-
to-day business of judging, Arnold said that it was important to (1) avoid
delays in resolving cases, (2) decide cases boldly, and (3) show respect for
litigants and their lawyers. Judge Arnold was a frequent speaker and author,
37. AAA Plans No Appeal of Basketball Ruling, ARK. GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 1979 at IC.
38. Traub, supra note 17, at C11.
39. See AAA Plans No Appeal of Basketball Ruling, supra note 37.
40. LR Woman Who Won Girls Basketball Suit Killed; Roommate Held, ARK. DEMOC-
RAT-GAZETTE, Nov. 11, 1991, at 8B.
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and each of the points above is best illustrated in Judge Arnold's own
words.
A. "The first duty of a court is to decide a case.' '
Judge Arnold was concerned about delays in the judicial system. In a
tribute to Judge Henry Woods, Arnold wrote, "He was decisive, which, after
all, is an indispensable quality for a judge. The job of a judge is to decide
cases, not to dither over them. Cases do not normally improve with age. 42
In Dodson, after the two-day hearing on the plaintiff's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, the parties had waited nearly eighteen months for a ruling.
The delay was occasioned in part by Judge Shell's death, but the case had
lingered in his court almost ten months after the hearing.
Once on the bench in Judge Shell's place, Arnold wasted no time re-
solving the matter. Judge Arnold issued his opinion in the case in less than
three weeks after receiving the prepared trial transcript. The litigants de-
served an answer, and deserved no further delays or the additional expense
of a rehearing before a new judge. Yet Judge Arnold decided the case and
wrote his opinion with great care. He made the effort to understand and
articulate the differences between the two games. Because Arnold took time
to understand the rules of half-court basketball, he could make critical dis-
tinctions that the other courts had missed. His notes from the hearing tran-
script and briefs of the case are meticulous.
Arnold's speeches and writings often emphasized speedy, yet careful,
resolution of cases as necessary to the continued acceptability of the judicial
branch by the public:
You have to get the case out the door, because there are other cases wait-
ing on it. Then you have to try to get it right, [and] write an opinion
which is intelligible, which explains the result, and which we hope, is
acceptable to the losing side.... And so it's important how opinions are
written.... And that takes time. I worry that sometimes our opinions are
not living up to that standard.
43
Over the course of his career, Arnold was increasingly concerned
about the volume facing the federal courts and whether, without additional
judgeships, the federal courts could continue to produce quality work at an
41. Richard S. Arnold, The Future of the Federal Courts, 60 MO. L. REv. 533, 536
(1995).
42. Richard S. Arnold, Judge Henry Woods: A Reminiscence, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REv. 229, 230 (2003).
43. Arnold, supra note 41, at 536.
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acceptable pace." A conscientious judge should keep the wheels of justice
moving:
People want to know the answer. They want a result. It's important to
them of course that the result be in their favor, but if they're going to
lose anyway, it's important for them to know quickly. The virtue high-
lighted here is quickness, promptness, no agonizing over Ahest maters,
but just deciding them. That is a virtue that judges should have in
mind.
45
In Dodson, in fact, it appears that the AAA preferred the decision to be
in the hands of the federal courts because its members were relatively
evenly divided, and two different votes on the subject produced two differ-
ent results in a six-month period. The AAA needed to take no further action
once the Dodson case was decided. The AAA's decision not to appeal was
ratified by a vote of nearly two to one among all member schools, not just
those with girls' basketball programs. 46 The issue was resolved, and all Ar-
kansas schools made the transition to full-court basketball in the following
season.
Delay in the course of justice was a topic of concern to Judge Arnold
because of his larger belief in the courts as an essential function of good
government and at bottom engaged in public service:
[J]udges, in common with members of the Executive Branch and mem-
bers of the Legislative Branch, are public servants. We work for the
people. We derive whatever power we have from their consent, and if
the day comes in this country when the people cease to give general
consent to the exercise of judicial power, that's the day we will have no
more courts, and that's the day we shouldn't have any more courts.
47
Arnold fulfilled this obligation in Dodson, with his quick resolution of a
case that had languished in the system.
44. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, The Federal Courts: Causes of Discontent, 56 S.M.U.
L. REv. 767 (2003).
45. Arnold, supra note 2, at 667.
46. AAA Plans No Appeal of Basketball Ruling, supra note 37.
47. Richard S. Arnold, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, Remarks at a
Symposium on the Judiciary Sponsored by the Arkansas Bar Association Committe for the
Bicentennial of the Constitution 2 (July 2, 1987) (copy of manuscript on file with the author).
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B. "[I]f we become timid when the moment comes for the exercise of
power, if we pull our punches in that sort of situation, then we are false
to the very function that called us into being, and we have forgotten
what the framers wanted when they created an independent judici-
ary.' 8
Judge Arnold also believed it was important for judges to be bold-to
have courage in the exercise of power. He once said,
After you are convinced that you have jurisdiction, after you have given
to the state courts and to the other branches of government the deference
and respect that is their due, after you have satisfied yourself that you
really are, if there is a statute involved, enforcing the will of the legisla-
ture, after all of those hurdles have been gotten over, then the greatest er-
ror that a judge can make is to pull your punches because you're afraid
that the majority of your neighbors are not going to like what you de-
cide.
49
Dodson is a good example. No doubt Judge Arnold was sensitive to the
likely response of critics that the rules of a game of basketball could not
possibly implicate the federal Constitution. Just after Arnold was sworn-in
as a new federal judge, George Will published an editorial in the Washing-
ton Post and other syndicated newspapers excoriating the Tennessee district
court for its ruling in favor of full-court basketball for women, maintaining
that "[a] federal judge can be found to do anything."5 ° After Arnold's deci-
sion, in fact, an Arkansas basketball coach wrote to the Arkansas Gazette
that it was "beyond my comprehension how courts have jurisdiction over
the rules of a game. 51 Judge Arnold said later that he expected the decision
would be reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, given the prior
decision by the Sixth Circuit. Nonetheless, he believed it was the right deci-
sion, whether or not he was to be reversed.
Henry Morgan, the attorney for Diana Lee Dodson, believed that the
executives of the AAA were happy with Judge Arnold's decision. He said,
What I wanted to do was help Arkansas compete with other states. And
although they never said so, I think the AAA leadership was for the
same. They thought it would be good. The coaches had voted one way
and they wouldn't roll over, but now they could tell the coaches they
48. Richard S. Arnold, Improving the Public's Perceptions of Federal Judges, 17 SOc'Y
OF BARRISTERS Q. 314, 325 (1982).
49. Id. at 324.
50. George F. Will, Six Players in Search of Sense at HEW, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1978,
at A19.
51. Jim Yeager, Letter to the Editor, ARK. GAZETrE, April 10, 1979, at 8A.
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didn't want the expense of appeal. And so that one judge changed Ar-
kansas.
52
Ed McCorkle, the attorney for the AAA, recalled surprise with the rul-
ing, but nonetheless was happy with the resolution:
We tried the case. And we had witnesses who talked about the merits of
the case, and why this was better or that was better. But in the middle of
the case a decision was handed down by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals that three-on-three was OK from a federal constitutional stand-
point. And I said, "Aha! This case is over. I have won."
Well, Judge Shell couldn't decide the case. He took it under advisement.
But I never had that happen before or since that you get a favorable de-
cision, although from a different circuit, and you think you are going to
win. And Judge Shell never ruled on the case. Now Judge Arnold, it
didn't take him any time. 1ie ruled, and I was of course flabbergasted
about all of it. I thought, "How could you do this to me, Judge Arnold?"
Both of them [Richard and Morris Arnold] are pretty quick learners, and
when they make a decision, they make a decision, and they move on.
And that's what Richard did.
After I got the decision, I sent it to my people and we all talked about it,
and said how in the world could he do this to us in the face of the Sixth
Circuit decision? And finally we came to the conclusion, "Who cares?
This is wonderful, the issue is solved."
53
In an address in 2002 before the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference at
Duluth, Minnesota, Judge Arnold said, "[T]here is probably more danger in
the courts from an excess of timidity than from an excess of boldness in
decision, and yet the timid among us may get reversed less. 54 Whether a
judge is affirmed or not "is not really a true measure of judicial prowess.
The decision that is reversed today may be the law of tomorrow." 55 By
"boldness of decision," Judge Arnold meant that momentary popularity or
public acceptance is not the guide:
But if by public opinion we mean the shifts of popular emotion that oc-
cur from day to day, if that is the beat to which the courts should march,
then we will not long have courts worthy of the name. Our courts will be
blown about by every wind of doctrine, and the security we have found
52. Telephone interview with Henry Morgan, attorney for Diana Dodson, Arkadelphia,
Ark. (Dec. 7, 2004) (transcript on fite with the author).
53. Telephone interview with Ed McCorkle, attorney for the Arkansas Activities Asso-
ciation, Arkadelphia, Ark. (Dec. 7, 2004) (transcript on file with the author).
54. Richard S. Arnold, The Art of Judging, Address before the Eighth Circuit Judicial
Conference, Duluth, Minn. 21 (Aug. $, 2002) (manuscript copy on file with the author).
55. Id. at 21-22.
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in a Constitution that restrains government even, or especially, when it
acts to carry out the majority will, will soon be gone.
56
Dodson seems to epitomize Judge Arnold's meaning. And yet, how-
ever one views his ruling on the constitutional issue, Arnold was clearly
conservative with respect to the plaintiffs statutory claim under Title IX.
Judge Arnold dismissed the Title IX claim on the ground that there was "no
evidence in this record that any 'educational program or activity' involved
here received 'federal financial assistance."'' 57 In other words, Judge Arnold
did not recognize a private right of action under Title LX, and believed that
Title IX did not apply to athletic programs of schools receiving any type of
federal assistance unless federal money went directly to the athletic pro-
gram.
Both of those propositions are no longer the law today.58 Nonetheless,
Judge Arnold's views of Title IX probably comported with those of most
other federal judges at the time. Just over one month after the Dodson opin-
ion was filed, the United States Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of
Chicago decided that Title IX did imply a private right of action59 As to the
question of what constituted "receipt" of federal funds under the statute, that
issue would not finally be resolved by the United States Supreme Court
until 1984. In Grove City College v. Bell,60 the Court adopted a "program-
specific" approach consistent with Judge Arnold's ruling in Dodson. Con-
gress responded with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,61 legisla-
tively overturning Grove City College. The Act expressly adopted an "insti-
tution-wide" approach so that if any part of a school or institution receives
federal financial assistance, all of the school's programs are subject to Title
IX.
62
To the extent the United States Supreme Court was later judged to be
"wrong" in its interpretation of Title IX, then so was Judge Arnold. Because
of his resolution of the constitutional issue in favor of the plaintiff, however,
not much turned on the additional Title IX claim. Arnold's restraint on the
statutory issue was not inconsistent with "boldness" in decision-making. As
Arnold himself said, a judge should not be bold in the sense of making law
or imposing preferences but should decide a case in a way the law permits
or requires, regardless of public opinion. He interpreted the statute in a way
56. Id. at 22.
57. Dodson v. Ark. Activities Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 394, 396 n.l (E.D. Ark. 1979).
58. See generally Diane Heckman, Women and Athletics: A Twenty-Year Retrospective
on Title IX, 9 U. MiAMt ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 (1992) (recounting history of judicial in-
terpretation of Title IX).
59. 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
60. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
61. Pub. L. 100-259 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000)).
62. See Heckman, supra note 58, at 32-33.
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he intended to be respectful of Congress, and in Grove City College six Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court agreed with him. In any event, since the Grove
City College decision, the "greatest progress in achieving female representa-
tion in athletics" has been under Title LX,63 not the Equal Protection Clause.
Judge Arnold's "boldness" of decision was not the statutory interpreta-
tion issue but the constitutional right. As a circuit judge, Arnold reflected
upon the constitutional decision-making process. 64 That process, he said,
involves several steps. First, and most importantly, a judge looks to the
words of the Constitution.65 Second, to the extent those words are not clear,
a judge should try to ascertain the intent behind the document, either from
historical research or reasonable inferences from the structure.6 6 Third,
judges look to precedent, and for lower-court judges the United States Su-
preme Court's precedent is decisive.67 But the really difficult cases, he said,
are those that are not answered by any of the above, and in those cases, the
greatest danger lies in the influence of a judge's own personal preferences.68
Solving these kinds of constitutional law questions, as Arnold seems to
have done in Dodson, requires a judge to avoid putting personal preferences
into law. For Arnold, he would of necessity:
[C]ome to it with, I guess, some feeling about American history, [and]
some presumption about personal liberty .... Now that doesn't mean
that other people can't come to it with different but equally legitimate
presumptions, but it does mean that in a case like this personal philoso-
phy, which I hope is a little bit different from mere personal preference,
comes into play.
69
A judge should bring to constitutional decisions "the best knowledge you
can get of American history and tradition, your sense of our system, your
sense of the American ideal of worth of the individual. 7 °
Judge Arnold believed that "boldness," consistent with conservative
judicial behavior of which Judge Arnold approved, consisted of five points:
1. Be confined by precedent;
2. Insist that jurisdiction not be exercised unless you are sure that
you have it. This is especially true of the federal courts, which are
courts of limited jurisdiction;
63. Trudy Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title 1X: Have We Made
Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1107, 1111 (1998).
64. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 47, at 2.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id. at 4-5.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 5-6.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Arnold, supra note 47, at 8.
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3. Decide points only when properly preserved in the record and
properly argued by the lawyers;
4. Decide only what is necessary to the case; and
715. Avoid constitutional questions whenever you can.
Judge Arnold's notes of the Dodson case reveal that he carefully con-
sidered the determinations in other jurisdictions that the equal protection
claim in the rules of girls basketball presented, at best, a de minimis injury.
He also considered, but rejected, the Oklahoma district court's argument
that the equal protection claim in this context was not worthy of recognition
because it did not implicate a fundamental right such as free speech or the
right to vote. Arnold's opinion in Dodson dealt with constitutional uncer-
tainty in a decisive way.
C. "We ought to be mindful that every time somebody appears in court,
that person is part of that body of 'the governed' on whose continued
consent our power depends. ... I'm suggesting that it's also desirable
that we be deferential and respectful towards other people even when
we are rejecting or disagreeing with what they have done or said.,
72
Richard Arnold was widely known and lauded for his politeness and
his enduring respect of persons. He showed the utmost respect for litigants
and the lawyers who appeared before him. This was true in oral argument,
in dealings with staff and law clerks, and even (or especially) in chance
meetings with strangers in public. It was also true of his approach to writing
judicial opinions. Arnold knew that the losing side would not like the result.
His opinions would be written clearly and simply, so that the losing litigant
might at least understand the reason for losing. Arnold did not avoid painful
truths, but he never demeaned any person in a judicial opinion. We have all
seen examples of judicial opinions that ridicule or rail against lawyers or
litigants, or try to show cleverness at someone's expense, but Judge Arnold
would never approve.
This sentiment is related to Judge Arnold's admonition that there was
"no such thing as a small case." In Dodson, Arnold never trivialized the
claim of a fourteen-year-old girl. Henry Morgan recalled a conversation
with Arnold some years after the case: "He remembered who I was. I talked
to him about that 'silly' basketball case, thinking he might not remember.
He said, 'Oh I remember that case, and it was not silly. It was my first case.
Sports is very important in America."' 73 Arnold himself later told the Ar-
kansas Democrat-Gazette,
71. Id. at 9-10.
72. Arnold, supra note 48, at 314-15.
73. Telephone interview with Henry Morgan, supra note 452.
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[Dodson] was an important case to people interested in basketball,
which includes everyone. I've had people come up to me and say you
shouldn't be involved in anything that trivial. Basketball is not trivial.
And it isn't trivial that the girls were being made to play an inferior form
of the game either. Aside from other things, it put them at a disadvan-
tage in getting scholarships. So that was important. Women's basketball
is growing and a lot more people are interested in it.
74
Other courts had trivialized the claim that half-court rules for girls'
basketball violated equal protection. The Sixth Circuit, for instance, had
written that the plaintiff "has succeeded in procuring the order of a federal
court which imposes her own personal notions as to how the game of bas-
ketball should be played... ."7 Further, the court stated,
[I]t must be apparent that its basis is the distinct differences in physical
characteristics and capabilities between the sexes and that the differ-
ences are reflected in the sport of basketball by how the game itself is
played .... Since there are such differences in physical characteristics
and capabilities, we see no reason why the rules governing play cannot
be tailored to accommodate them without running afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause.
76
Similarly, the Oklahoma district court wrote,
Much of the rest of plaintiffs allegations of injury, e. g., learning unus-
able skills and being denied the opportunity to plan strategy, could be
measurably remedied simply by changing her position from guard to
forward. This is clearly not within the scope of the purpose of the federal
judiciary and does not merit the attention of the Court. It is sufficient to
say that the Court will not recognize a violation of constitutional rights
when based upon an athlete's assigned position on a team or when an
athlete disagrees with his/her coach.... [P]laintiffs only real complaint
is the denial of the pleasure and consequent physical development of the
full court game of basketball. Surely this cannot rise to the deprivation
of a constitutional right simply because it is the schools who are offering
the basketball program. It is an elective activity, after all, and one which
schools may or may not choose to offer.
77
The language Judge Arnold chose for his opinion in Dodson, however,
never demeaned the interest at stake, even though these other courts had
74. Phyllis D. Brandon, Richard Sheppard Arnold, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAz=Tr, Mar. 23,
1997, at 1D.
75. Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795 (1977).
76. Id.




done so. Consistent with Arnold's respect for people generally, he made an
effort to understand interests he could not personally identify with. He care-
fully followed the testimony presented at the hearing, noting its details.
Golf, not basketball, was his sport. Presumably he did not identify with the
game of basketball, given that he once said of a legal standard articulated in
9178a constitutional case, "If that's a Legal test, I'm a basketball player.
I believe that the extreme care with which Richard Arnold treated
claims under the Bill of Rights was related to his respect of persons. His
courtesy to others and careful analysis of individual constitutional claims
were symbiotic, even though he also frequently ruled against individual
constitutional claims. Dodson is an example of Arnold's sensitivity to indi-
vidual rights and his view of the Constitution as primarily a limitation on
government.
IV. A PERSONAL REMINISCENCE
My first job after law school was as a law clerk for Judge Richard Ar-
nold in Little Rock, Arkansas. The experience for a newly minted lawyer
and the intellectual challenge of the job were un-matched. But more mun-
dane circumstances were ideal, too. The chambers were only one block
from what was then the downtown Little Rock YMCA, an ancient building
with an echoing basketball court on the top floor. At noon daily, pick-up
basketball teams engaged in spirited, if not particularly talented, competi-
tion. The participants included not a few lawyers, and except for me in those
games, all men. The games otherwise resembled traditional basketball at its
finest. It was full court, five players per team, running the full length of the
court. I thoroughly enjoyed the exercise and camaraderie, especially since I
felt as though I could hold my own.
When I first learned to play basketball in Russellville, Arkansas, how-
ever, girls still played under half-court rules. (The center-court line was the
edge of an abyss. If one crossed that line, a whistle blew, play was stopped,
and the other team took possession of the ball.) My junior high career cul-
minated in a district championship for the Gardner Junior High Whirlwinds.
At the end of the season, our coach told us that to prepare for high school
basketball, we needed to learn a different game. All girls' basketball games
in Arkansas would henceforth be played according to the boys' rules. I be-
lieve it was my first real encounter with gender equity in action.
Not particularly aware of civic affairs at that time, I did not think much
about the reason for the change in rules. Many years tater, at work in Judge
Arnold's chambers, I came across an opinion he had written as a district
court judge. The case, of course, was Dodson, and in it was a gem of a
78. Arnold, supra note 47, at 2.
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"small case." It was then that I realized I had learned to play full-court bas-
ketball as a high school student because the judge for whom I was clerking
had ordered that it be done. I searched for and found my first high school
yearbook. The yearbook noted that the Russellville Cyclones girls' basket-
ball team, of which I was a member, were district champions that year
(1980). It also noted that we had played full-court basketball for the first
time, the same as the boys' team. I showed the yearbook pages to Judge
Arnold, and I told him about my former teammates who had gone on to win
college scholarships to play basketball. These potential scholarships had
been an important element of Diana Dodson's claim that playing under half-
court rules disadvantaged Arkansas female athletes because all college
women's teams played full-court basketball. I remember to this day when
Judge Arnold later returned the yearbook. He did so with a smile and the
words, "I guess I did some good."
I have reflected many times upon the case and its unfolding. I went on
to play college basketball at Emory University, at St. Andrews University in
Scotland, and briefly for the Scottish Universities national team. I still play
and enjoy the game immensely. Limited though my abilities are-I am only
5'3" and slower by the year-I would not have played basketball as the
world plays had it not been for the critical rule change before I entered high
school.
I will end this rather lengthy personal digression with a brief assess-
ment of the lasting jurisprudential effect of this "little case." Was Dodson v.
Arkansas Activities Association influential outside of Arkansas? Yes, but
not in other courts on the direct issue of girls' half-court basketball rules.
Although a handful of courts have cited the Dodson opinion on related
questions of gender discrimination in sports,79 on the particular issue-the
constitutionality of half-court basketball rules for girls-only three other
states continued to play the game after the Dodson decision, and in all of
those states the change came about through each state's athletic association
rather than by court order. In Tennessee, where the Sixth Circuit had ruled
half-court basketball rules did not violate the federal Constitution,8 ° the
Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Association nonetheless voted to
change to the full-court game. Some schools in Oklahoma continued the
81half-court game through 1995.
In Iowa, like Oklahoma, the state's athletic association voted to allow
individual schools to choose between the two games, providing two separate
79. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. Mon. High Sch. Ass'n, 633 F. Supp. 1564, 1580 (D. Mont.
1986), aff'd, 858 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1988).
80. Cape, 563 F.2d at 794(1977).
81. Penny Soldan, Records Broken as Curtain Falls on 6-on-6 Basketball, THE DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, June 4, 1995, available at 1995 WL 6291219.
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state competitions.82 But Judge Arnold's opinion seems to have influenced
the outcome in Iowa. The Iowa Girls High School Athletic Union voted to
allow full-court competition only after three players sued in 1984. The law-
suit was based on Dodson's premise-that female students were not able to
compete for scholarships on the same terms as male players. United States
District Judge Donald O'Brien rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss
and scheduled the lawsuit for trial.83 The Iowa association decided to settle
the case, rather than proceed to trial, by voting to allow its members to play
full court if they wished. Judge Arnold was then sitting on the Eighth Cir-
cuit, of which Iowa is a member, no doubt giving the Dodson precedent
added weight.
More than a dozen journal articles 84 also mention Judge Arnold's opin-
ion in Dodson, including one that portrays Dodson as among the "revolu-
tionary" decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to mandate equal athletic opportunities for high school
females.8 5 One judge's decision, then, can have a far-reaching effect in ways
measured other than by the number of subsequent court citations.
No judge can or should be summed up in a single case. Any assess-
ment of Richard Arnold's judicial philosophy and contributions is made
difficult by the sheer volume of written opinions bearing his name from his
twenty-five years on the federal bench. Further, how a particular judge in-
fluenced the course of the law probably best reveals itself only with the pas-
sage of time-the endurance value of a judge's work. Nonetheless, it is al-
ready clear that Judge Arnold's decisions involving individual constitutional
rights are among his most important contributions and should withstand the
test of time. These opinions exhibit a lucidity and purpose apparent from his
82. See Chuck Schoffner, 6-Player Basketball Strong in Two States, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Aug. 19, 1990, available at 1990 WL 2953844 (stating that Iowa permitted full-
court basketball in 1984; Oklahoma did the same in 1987). The half-court game was voted
out of existence entirely in Iowa schools in 1993. 6-Player Basketball Voted Out in Iowa,
THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 4, 1993, available at 1993 WL 7176143.
83. Dismissal Motion Denied. Judge Decides to Hear 6-Girl Basketball Suit, THE
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 27, 1984, available at 1984 WL 2516596.
84. See, e.g., Neena K. Chaudhry & Marcia D. Greenberger, Seasons of Change: Com-
munities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 41 (2003); Patricia A. Cain, Women, Race, and Sports: Life Before Title IX, 4 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 337, 350 (2001); Mark Kelman, (Why) Does Gender Equity in College Athlet-
ics Entail Gender Equality?, 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 77 (1997); Heckman, supra note 58;
Carolyn Ellis Staton, Sex Discrimination in Public Education, 58 Miss. L.J. 323, 348 (1988);
see generally Janet Junttila Johnson, Comment, Half-Court Girls 'Basketball Rules: An Ap-
plication of the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, 65 IOwA L. REV. 766 (1980).
85. Arline F. Schubert, George W. Schubert, & Cheryl L. Schubert-Madsen, Changes
Influenced by Litigation in Women 's Intercollegiate Athletics, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
237, 244-45 (1991).
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first days as a district court judge, even if Dodson was not one of the "great
constitutional questions" with which federal courts must often grapple.
8 6
The role of judges in the United States political system, and how
judges should decide cases, were topics Richard Arnold often reflected upon
in public speeches and published articles. He had much to say on this sub-
ject, only a small portion of which I have recounted here. Certainly we all
improve in our chosen vocations with experience, but one is hard pressed to
suggest how Judge Arnold might have improved his method, at least on
these issues, from the outset of his judicial career. He seemed primed for the
job from the first day. Dodson reflects Judge Arnold's commitment to a
particular view of the role of federal judges in our system of government
and the worth of the individual. This early case reveals a judicial philosophy
consistently apparent in his subsequent career.
86. Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 291 (1997).
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